

Tutorial: Philosophy of Mind
Berlin School of Mind and Brain
Winter Semester 18/19

Teacher Juan R. Loaiza
Berlin School of Mind and Brain
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Contact loaiza.juan@hu-berlin.de

Office hours by arrangement

Time Wednesday 12:15 – 13:45 (start 25.10.17)

Location Invalidenstraße 110, 10115 Berlin, Room 449

Class requirements:

- 75% punctual attendance.
- Read the texts as specified below.
- Prepare questions as concrete as possible and be ready to discuss.

All the mandatory readings will be uploaded to Moodle, but many are also available online. Suggested readings can be found online or requested.

Topics and mandatory readings:

17.10 **Introduction**

General concepts

24.10 **Truth and Knowledge**

Lemos, N. (2007). Knowledge, truth, and justification. In *An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge* (pp. 1-21). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gettier, E. L. (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? *Analysis*, 23(6), 121–123.

31.10 **Arguments**

Copi, I., et al. (2014). Basic Logical Concepts. In *Introduction to Logic* (Ch. 1, Sections 2, 5 & 6). Essex: Pearson Education.

Basic problems in philosophy of mind

07.11 **Dualism**

Gerder, B. (forthcoming). Dualism: how epistemic issues drive debates about the ontology of consciousness. In U. Kriegel (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

14.11 **No class**

21.11 **Logical Behaviourism**

Ryle, G. (1949/2009). *The Concept of Mind* (Ch. 1 & 2, pp. 1-48). London: Routledge.

- 28.11 **Identity Theory**
 Place, U. T. (1956). Is Consciousness a Brain Process? *British Journal of Psychology*, 47(1), 44–50.
 Smart, J. J. C. (1959). Sensations and Brain Processes. *The Philosophical Review*, 68(2), 141–156.
- 05.12 **Functionalism**
 Putnam, H. (1967/1975). The Nature of Mental States. In *Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers*, Volume 2 (pp. 429–440). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 12.12 **Eliminative Materialism**
 Churchland, P. M. (1981). Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 78(2), 67–90
- 19.12 **Multiple Realization**
 Kim, J. (1992). Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 52(1), 1–26.
- 09.01 **Extended Mind**
 Drayson, Z. (2010). Extended cognition and the metaphysics of mind. *Cognitive Systems Research*, 11(4), 367–377.

Consciousness

- 16.01 **The Explanatory Gap**
 Jackson, F. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 32(127), 127–136.
 Chalmers, D. J. (2003). Consciousness and its place in nature (Excerpt). In S. P. Stich & T. A. Warfield (Eds.), *The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind* (pp. 102–112). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
- 23.01 **Access and Phenomenal Consciousness**
 Block, N. (2002). Concepts of Consciousness. In Chalmers, David (Ed.), *Philosophy of Mind: classical and contemporary readings* (pp. 206–218). New York: Oxford University Press.
- 30.01 **Overcoming the explanatory gap?**
 Lynch, M. P. (2006). Zombies and the Case of the Phenomenal Pickpocket. *Synthese*, 149(1), 37–58.

Other issues

- 06.02 **EXAM**
- 13.02 **Explanation in psychology and neuroscience**
 Bechtel, W. (2008). Mechanisms in Cognitive Psychology: What Are the Operations? *Philosophy of Science*, 75, 983–994.

Updated: 15.10.18

Suggested readings:

Note: Articles from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy are always recommended.

Dualism

Descartes, R. (1640/2000). *Meditations on First Philosophy (Meditations 2 & 6)*. In R. Ariew (Ed.), *René Descartes: philosophical essays and correspondence* (pp. 91–141). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.

Searle, John R. (2002). Why I am not a property dualist. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 9 (12):57-64.

Identity Theory

Armstrong, D. (1999). "The Identity Theory" (pp. 67-80). In *The Mind Body Problem*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Eliminative Materialism

Hacker, P. M. S. (2001). Eliminative Materialism. In S. Schroeder (Ed.), *Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind* (pp. 60–84). New York: Palgrave.

Functionalism

Putnam, Hilary (1960/1975). Minds and machines. In *Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers Vol. 2* (pp. 362-385). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Multiple Realization

Fodor, J. A. (1974). Special sciences (or: The disunity of science as a working hypothesis). *Synthese*, 28(2), 97–115.

Wilson, R. A. (2001). Two Views of Realization. *Philosophical Studies*, 104, 1–31.

Extended Mind

Clark, A., & Chalmers, D. J. (1998). The Extended Mind. *Analysis*, 58(1), 7–19.

The Explanatory Gap

Nagel, T. (1974). What Is It Like to Be a Bat? *The Philosophical Review*, 83(4), 435–450.

Papineau, D. (2011). What Exactly is the Explanatory Gap? *Philosophia*, 39(1), 5–19.

Access and Phenomenal Consciousness

Block, N. (1995). On a confusion about a function of consciousness. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 18(2), 227-247.

Block, N. (2007). Consciousness, accessibility, and the mesh between psychology and neuroscience. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 30(5–6), 481–499.

Overcoming the explanatory gap?

Pauen, M. (2006). Feeling causes. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 13(1–2), 129–152.

Explanation in psychology and neuroscience

Machamer, P. K., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. *Philosophy of Science*, 67(1), 1–25.

Wright, C. D., Bechtel, W., Gabbay, D. M., & Woods, J. (2007). Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation. In P. Thagard (Ed.), *Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science* (pp. 31–79). Amsterdam: Elsevier.